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HEALING A FRACTURED PREEMPTION 
DOCTRINE:  THE IMPACT OF MERCK SHARP & 




Patient safety depends on tort litigation to identify a brand-name drug’s 
undisclosed risks, illuminate flaws in a drug’s design, and raise concerns 
that a drug requires further study before it is safe for patient use.  However, 
since the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Wyeth v. Levine, which 
permitted the plaintiff to move forward but recognized an in-principle 
impossibility preemption defense, drug manufacturers have shielded 
themselves from liability under a range of circumstances.  Under this 
defense, federal law preempts state law tort actions against brand-name drug 
manufacturers in any court across the country.  Yet, the scope of the 
impossibility preemption defense remains unclear. 
On May 20, 2019, the Supreme Court clarified its interpretation of 
impossibility preemption in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht.  This 
case involved state law claims regarding Merck’s alleged failure to 
adequately warn patients and physicians of the risks of femoral fractures 
associated with Fosamax, a drug used to treat osteoporosis in 
postmenopausal women.  In Albrecht, the Supreme Court decided that 
impossibility preemption is a question of law for judges to decide, rather than 
a question of fact for a jury.  The Court also elaborated on Wyeth’s 
requirements for a viable impossibility preemption defense.  Ultimately, 
rather than deciding whether or not the plaintiffs’ state law claim in Albrecht 
was preempted, the Court remanded the case.  For now, the future of 
impossibility preemption defenses is left for lower courts to decide, but 
Albrecht provides the framework within which they must decide it. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht marks a step forward in the 
muddled path the Court has forged in this area.  While the Court attempts to 
provide a simple analytical framework for determining when impossibility 
preemption defenses succeed, questions remain about the power and 
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applicability of this defense for brand-name drug manufacturers.  This Note 
seeks to provide lower courts deciding impossibility preemption questions 
with a functional understanding of where the doctrine stands after Albrecht.  
Given the increasing pace of new brand-name drug approvals and the rise 
of product liability litigation involving pharmaceuticals, it is crucial that 
future litigants are aware of the status of the impossibility preemption 
defense.  If this defense still exists after Albrecht, it is also imperative that 
courts know it when they see it. 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 267 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPOSSIBILITY PREEMPTION IN BRAND-
NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG CASES ....................................... 269 
A.  Preemption Principles ...................................................... 269 
1.  Federal Drug Labeling Regulations ........................... 270 
2.  State Law Failure-to-Warn Claims ............................ 271 
B.  Wyeth v. Levine:  A Landmark Rejection of Impossibility 
Preemption ...................................................................... 272 
1.  The Facts of Wyeth ..................................................... 273 
2.  Creating a Clear Evidence Standard .......................... 274 
3.  Concurring and Dissenting Opinions ......................... 275 
C.  The Aftermath of Wyeth ................................................... 276 
II.  MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. V. ALBRECHT:  AN END TO THE 
PREEMPTION MUDDLE? ......................................................... 278 
A.  The Fosamax Litigation .................................................... 279 
1.  The Evolution of the Fosamax Label ......................... 279 
2.  Procedural History ..................................................... 282 
B.  Justice Breyer’s Opinion for the Court ............................ 283 
C.  Justice Thomas’s Concurrence ........................................ 285 
D.  Justice Alito’s Concurrence ............................................. 286 
E.  Interpretive Issues Raised by Justice Breyer’s 
Framework ...................................................................... 287 
III.  HOW SHOULD LOWER COURTS IMPLEMENT JUSTICE BREYER’S 
FRAMEWORK? ........................................................................ 288 
A.  The Meaning of the “Fully Informed” Requirement ........ 288 
1.  Applicability of the Fully Informed Requirement ..... 288 
2.  Ways to Satisfy the Fully Informed Requirement...... 289 
a.  What Does Not Fully Inform the FDA? ............... 290 
b.  Does Evidence the FDA Previously Accepted 
Suffice? ............................................................... 290 
3.  Is Actual FDA Response Required? .......................... 294 
4. Summary ..................................................................... 295 
2020] HEALING A FRACTURED PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 267 
B.  When Do State and Federal Laws Irreconcilably 
Conflict? ......................................................................... 295 
C.  What Actions Are Within the Scope of the FDA’s 
Congressionally Delegated Authority? ........................... 298 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 299 
INTRODUCTION 
[T]he question that we’re all kind of struggling with here seems to me to be 
this, or something along these lines:  Reading the statute your way, do we 
create a moral hazard that encourages manufacturers to supply the FDA 
with a lot of information, overwhelming with data, but maybe not the most 
artfully drafted and maybe deliberately inartfully drafted warning that it 
thinks is reasonably calculated to be refused, so that it can avoid having to 
shoulder or . . . internalize its own costs of negligence? 
—Justice Neil Gorsuch1 
 
It is a settled expectation that if a prescription drug manufacturer fails to 
provide adequate warnings about the risks of a medication and a patient 
taking the medication as intended suffers an unexpected injury as a result of 
the inadequate warning, the patient has a remedy at law.  For decades, 
however, pharmaceutical manufacturers have advocated an impossibility 
preemption defense:  that the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
approval of a drug label or rejection of a proposed label change prevents 
patients from bringing state law tort actions alleging deficient labeling 
because compliance with both state and federal law is impossible. 
In Wyeth v. Levine,2 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether FDA 
regulations preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against brand-name 
drug manufacturers.  In this landmark decision, the Court held that a state 
law failure-to-warn claim could proceed even if the FDA had fully approved 
a drug’s label.3  Defendant-manufacturers could only escape liability if they 
could provide “clear evidence that the [FDA] would not have approved a 
change to [the drug’s] label.”4  The Court noted that Wyeth, the drug 
manufacturer, did not present such evidence,5 but the Court left the standard 
otherwise undefined.  On its face, Wyeth presented a major win for plaintiffs 
and potentially signaled the death of impossibility preemption for 
manufacturers who could not establish this “demanding defense.”6  However, 
a more sophisticated interpretation of Wyeth permitted brand-name drug 
manufacturers to pursue exactly the strategy Justice Gorsuch adverted to in 
 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. 
Ct. 1668 (2019) (No. 17-290). 
 2. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 3. See id. at 581. 
 4. Id. at 571. 
 5. Id. at 572 (“Wyeth has offered no such evidence.”). 
 6. Id. at 573. 
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the Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht7 oral arguments:  overwhelming 
the FDA with data in an effort to ensure a proposed label was rejected.8  
Unfortunately, courts have reached opposite conclusions about the limits of 
the impossibility preemption defense over the last decade, so it remains 
unclear when state law failure-to-warn claims can proceed.9 
For example, a district court judge in New Jersey recently threw out 
hundreds of state law failure-to-warn claims that the Third Circuit later 
vacated and remanded based on conflicting interpretations of Wyeth.10  This 
litigation culminated in Albrecht, where, “[i]n light of differences and 
uncertainties among the courts of appeals and state supreme courts in respect 
to the application of Wyeth,” the Supreme Court further clarified the 
procedure for deciding impossibility preemption defenses.11  The question 
presented in Albrecht was simple:  whether a judge or a jury should decide 
impossibility preemption defenses.12  In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the 
Court succinctly reasoned that judges are “better equipped” than juries “to 
evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination . . . and to 
interpret agency decisions in light of the governing statutory and regulatory 
context.”13  Therefore, the Court held preemption is a question of law for 
judges to decide.14 
The Court’s analysis did not stop there.  As part of his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Breyer elaborated on Wyeth’s impossibility preemption 
requirements.  The Court defined Wyeth’s “clear evidence” standard as 
“evidence that shows the court that the drug manufacturer fully informed the 
FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law and that the 
FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not 
approve a change to the drug’s label to include that warning.”15  The Court 
also held that “clear evidence” is not a heightened evidentiary standard but 
rather a requirement that the court consider “whether the relevant federal and 
state laws ‘irreconcilably conflict.’”16  Lastly, the Court noted that the only 
agency actions that can determine the answer to preemption questions are 
those “taken pursuant to the [FDA’s] congressionally delegated authority.”17 
On its face, the 9-0 Albrecht decision resolved an easy case—the opinion 
settles a narrow procedural question and appears to define Wyeth’s clear 
 
 7. 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019). 
 8. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13. 
 9. See, e.g., Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“The Supreme Court, however, did not clarify what constitutes ‘clear evidence.’”); Dobbs v. 
Wyeth Pharm., 797 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (W.D. Okla. 2011) (“[L]ower courts are left to 
determine what satisfies this ‘clear evidence’ standard in each case.” (quoting Schilf v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., No. CIV 07-4015, 2010 WL 3909909, at *4 (D.S.D. Sept. 30, 2010))). 
 10. See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 302 (3d 
Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668. 
 11. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1676. 
 12. Id. at 1672. 
 13. Id. at 1680. 
 14. Id. at 1679. 
 15. Id. at 1672. 
 16. Id. at 1679 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)). 
 17. Id. 
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evidence requirement along the way.  But the Court’s deeper analysis of 
Wyeth raises complex questions about when state law failure-to-warn claims 
involving brand-name prescription drugs can proceed.  This Note elaborates 
on the framework sketched by Justice Breyer in the majority opinion, 
identifies the gaps that remain, and suggests how those gaps may be filled.  
Manufacturers raising impossibility preemption defenses and courts deciding 
preemption questions must both understand what “fully inform[s]” the FDA 
under Justice Breyer’s framework.18  Future litigants and judges must also 
understand when state and federal laws “irreconcilably conflict”19 and what 
agency actions fall within the FDA’s “congressionally delegated 
authority.”20  The concurring opinions in Albrecht and lower court decisions 
after Wyeth offer important clues to inform this analysis.  Without answers 
to these lingering questions, impossibility preemption will remain an area 
where “muddle . . . dominates over clarity.”21 
This Note is organized into three parts.  Part I examines the impossibility 
preemption landscape leading up to Albrecht, including the landmark Wyeth 
decision and its aftermath.  Part II examines the Albrecht decision and 
identifies three core interpretive issues that arise from the majority opinion, 
which must be resolved before courts can uniformly address impossibility 
preemption defenses.  Part III explores how lower courts should approach the 
interpretive issues identified in Part II and argues that while the Albrecht 
decision is more complex than it appears, it is nonetheless illuminating for 
courts deciding impossibility preemption defenses as a matter of law. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPOSSIBILITY PREEMPTION IN BRAND-NAME 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG CASES 
Part I of this Note examines the evolution of federal preemption 
jurisprudence.  Part I.A provides an overview of federal preemption 
principles in the context of brand-name prescription drugs and highlights the 
confusion among courts deciding impossibility preemption defenses before 
Wyeth.  Part I.B examines the Supreme Court’s landmark Wyeth decision.  
Part I.C assesses Wyeth’s impact on federal preemption jurisprudence over 
the last decade, which culminated in the Albrecht case that is the focus of this 
Note. 
A.  Preemption Principles 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that the 
“Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
 
 18. Id. at 1672. 
 19. Id. at 1679. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption:  More Muddle, or 
Creeping to Clarity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 229 (2009); see also Brief of Tort Law Professors 
John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
*4, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) (“The application of implied preemption doctrine 
untethered from any guiding text carries great risk of undermining federalism values.”). 
270 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
Law of the Land.”22  This language serves as the foundation for the federal 
preemption doctrine, which mandates that when state and federal laws 
conflict, the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted.23  
“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption 
case,”24 and there is a “presumption against pre-emption.”25  While there is 
serious debate among the Justices about the purpose of Congress regarding 
preemption, as well as the scope of the presumption against preemption, these 
principles remain cornerstones of modern preemption law.26 
The Supreme Court has identified three types of preemption:  “express 
preemption,” in which a federal law expressly states that it preempts state 
law; “field preemption,” in which federal law occupies the entire field of an 
issue; and “conflict preemption,” in which either simultaneous compliance 
with federal and state regulations is impossible (“impossibility preemption”) 
or state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal goals 
(“obstacle preemption”).27  This Note will focus on brand-name drug 
manufacturers’ use of the impossibility preemption defense. 
1.  Federal Drug Labeling Regulations 
Manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceutical products are subject to the 
product approval and labeling standards articulated by the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act28 (FDCA).  To distribute a drug, a manufacturer 
must demonstrate to the FDA that the drug is “safe for use under the 
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed 
labeling.”29  Before a drug is approved for distribution, the FDA must 
approve the exact text of the label.30  Drug manufacturers are also required 
to submit proposed label changes to the FDA as new information arises to 
ensure that labels remain accurate while the drug is on the market.31 
To propose labeling changes, manufacturers may submit a Prior Approval 
Supplement (PAS) application, which the FDA then must approve before 
changes can be implemented.32  Alternatively, under the FDA’s “Changes 
Being Effected” (CBE) regulation, manufacturers may unilaterally add to or 
strengthen a label “to reflect newly acquired information.”33  Manufacturers 
who file a supplemental application under the CBE regulation can make these 
 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 23. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018). 
 24. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 
470, 485 (1996)). 
 25. Id. at 565 n.3. 
 26. See Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 213. 
 27. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
 28. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(h). 
 29. Id. § 355(d). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)–(c) (2019). 
 32. See id. § 314.70(b). 
 33. See id. § 314.70(c). 
 33. See id. 
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label changes immediately without FDA approval.34  However, the FDA will 
reject CBE revisions if it determines there is insufficient evidence of a causal 
link between use of the drug and the risk at issue.35  These types of label 
rejections reflect the FDA’s concern that excessive or unnecessary warnings 
may discourage appropriate use of a valuable drug.36 
2.  State Law Failure-to-Warn Claims 
Although the FDA must approve a drug’s label before it reaches the 
market, FDA approval does not automatically bar state law tort actions 
alleging that a label is incomplete.37  Indeed, the Court’s decision in Wyeth 
states that Congress declined to include a private right of action for damages 
when it enacted the FDCA in 1938, specifically because damages claims 
were widely available under state law.38  In the eighty-one years since the 
FDCA’s enactment, no express preemption clause has been added.39  The 
Supreme Court has also rejected field preemption in the pharmaceutical and 
medical device areas.40 
In the early 2000s, pharmaceutical defendants began to pursue the only 
remaining avenue for preemption by raising conflict preemption defenses.41  
Manufacturers argued that state tort law required them to act in ways that 
federal regulations precluded.42  Specifically, manufacturers argued that 
simultaneous compliance with both federal and state law was impossible 
because the FDA either rejected or would have rejected a warning label 
required under state law.43 
 
 34. See id. 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 36. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,605–06 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, and 814). 
 37. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009) (“The 1962 amendments added a 
saving clause, indicating that a provision of state law would only be invalidated upon a ‘direct 
and positive conflict’ with the FDCA.”(quoting Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
781, 76 Stat. 781, 793)). 
 38. See id. at 574 n.7 (citing the legislative history of the FDCA). 
 39. See id. at 567 (noting that Congress amended the FDCA to include an express 
preemption clause for medical devices, but that “it declined to enact such a provision for 
prescription drugs”). 
 40. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985) 
(explaining that courts should not infer field preemption “whenever an agency deals with a 
problem comprehensively,” because such an inference would be inconsistent with “the 
federal-state balance embodied in [the Court’s] Supremacy Clause jurisprudence”). 
 41. See Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 390–91 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Interestingly enough, the idea of conflict preemption in prescription drug cases is relatively 
new.  Until the early 2000s, prescription drug companies infrequently invoked the preemption 
defense, and when they did, it rarely succeeded.”(first citing Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 
Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 537 (6th Cir. 1993); and then citing Hill v. Searle Lab’ys, 884 F.2d 1064, 
1068 (8th Cir. 1989))). 
 42. See Brief for Petitioner at 26–27, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249) (“Respondent’s 
state-law tort claims conflict with the regime Congress established in the FDCA . . . .”). 
 43. Id. at 26 (noting that “it would have been impossible for Wyeth to comply with the 
purported state-law duty to modify Phenergan’s labeling to contraindicate intravenous 
administration of Phenergan without violating the FDCA”). 
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Impossibility preemption arguments became the subject of intense policy 
debate.  Consumer advocates argued that state tort liability was necessary to 
ensure patient safety, while manufacturers claimed that the threat of tort 
liability limited patient access to beneficial drugs by leaving innovators 
vulnerable to costly litigation and undermining the FDA’s authority.44  
Courts were also split on the validity of impossibility preemption defenses.  
Some courts rejected preemption defenses,45 while others were persuaded by 
defendants’ impossibility arguments.46  As impossibility preemption 
defenses gained traction, the FDA’s position on preemption defenses also 
shifted, causing further division among courts.47  In the preamble to a January 
2006 FDA rule (“2006 preamble”) and several amicus briefs filed in favor of 
defendant-manufacturers, the FDA stated that the FDCA established both a 
floor and a ceiling for labeling regulations, rendering all state law claims 
preempted.48  As cases flooded courts and confusion mounted, it became 
clear that the Supreme Court needed to weigh in on the issue.49 
B.  Wyeth v. Levine:  A Landmark Rejection of Impossibility Preemption 
In its seminal Wyeth decision in 2009, the Supreme Court held that 
impossibility preemption defenses do not necessarily shield brand-name drug 
manufacturers from state law liability.50  The Court created a fact-specific 
test for deciding whether failure-to-warn claims against brand-name drug 
 
 44. See KATHRYN B. ARMSTRONG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10064, IS IMPOSSIBILITY 
PREEMPTION IMPOSSIBLE?:  FEDERAL DRUG LAW AND PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT CLAIMS 1 
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10064.pdf [https://perma.cc/X99N-UJ3R]. 
 45. See, e.g., Knipe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 583 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(rejecting defendant’s impossibility preemption defense); Tucker v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (same); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. 
Supp. 2d 776 (E.D. La. 2007) (same). 
 46. See, e.g., Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627 (C.D. Ill. 
2008), rev’d, 596 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2010) (accepting defendant’s impossibility preemption 
defense); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1291 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (accepting 
defendant’s impossibility preemption defense), vacated, 606 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 47. See Tucker, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (rejecting defendant’s impossibility preemption 
defense and noting that the “FDA’s current position on preemption is not ‘long standing’ but 
in fact a ‘180-degree reversal’ from its earlier stance” (quoting David A. Kessler & David C. 
Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 
GEO. L.J. 461, 474 n.59 (2008))). 
 48. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934–36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 19, Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S 555 (2009) (No. 06-1246); Amicus 
Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and in 
Favor of Reversal of the District Court’s Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to 
Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 2, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 
2002) (Nos. 02-55372 & 02-55498); Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Defendants-Appellees at 5–6, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(No. 06-3107). 
 49. See Mason, 596 F.3d at 391 (“Not surprisingly, courts began to issue contradicting 
opinions, which led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Levine to decide the issue.”). 
 50. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009). 
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manufacturers are preempted on conflict grounds.51  The decision officially 
opened the door for injured plaintiffs filing state law failure-to-warn claims 
and established the fundamental principle that manufacturers are responsible 
for the contents of their drug labels at all times.52 
1.  The Facts of Wyeth 
Diana Levine received two doses of Phenergan, an anti-nausea drug 
manufactured by Wyeth to treat nausea caused by migraine headaches.53  
Phenergan can be administered via the “IV push” method, where the drug is 
injected directly into a patient’s vein, or the “IV drip” method, where the 
drug is presented in a saline solution in an intravenous bag and slowly enters 
a patient’s vein through a catheter.54  The drug is known to cause irreversible 
gangrene if it enters an artery.55  After an IV drip dose of Phenergan failed 
to relieve Levine’s nausea, a second dose was administered via the riskier IV 
push method.  This dose somehow entered Levine’s artery, resulting in 
gangrene and the eventual amputation of Levine’s right forearm.56 
Levine sued Wyeth in Vermont state court claiming that:  (1) Wyeth’s 
labeling was defective because it failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV 
drip method, rather than the high-risk IV push method and (2) more broadly, 
that Phenergan was not safe for intravenous administration.57  Wyeth argued 
that Levine’s failure-to-warn claims were impliedly preempted by federal 
law based on the 2006 preamble, which noted that FDA approval of a drug’s 
label preempts state laws imposing liability for negligent labeling.58  Wyeth 
also claimed that Phenergan labels adequately stated the risks of the IV push 
method and noted that the IV drip method was the preferable method of 
administration.59  Lastly, Wyeth argued that the FDA’s previous rejection of 
a label change concerning risks of arterial exposure illustrated that the FDA 
would have rejected stronger proposed warnings concerning the IV push 
method.60 
The trial court rejected Wyeth’s preemption defense, and a jury found that 
Wyeth failed to provide adequate warning of the catastrophic risks of 
injecting Phenergan directly into a patient’s vein.61  The court also found that 
Levine’s claim was not preempted because neither Wyeth nor the FDA had 
 
 51. Id. at 571. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 558–59. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 559. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 560. 
 58. Id. at 560–61. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 562 (noting that the FDA instructed Wyeth to keep the verbiage in its current 
label regarding intra-arterial injections). 
 61. Id. at 558. 
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paid more than “passing attention” to the question of increased IV push 
warnings.62 
The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wyeth could have 
added increased warnings against IV push administration without prior FDA 
approval and noting that federal labeling requirements create a floor, not a 
ceiling, for state regulation.63  Wyeth appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
arguing that:  (1) the FDA’s drug labeling judgments preempt state law 
failure-to-warn claims alleging that different labels were necessary to make 
drugs reasonably safe for use and (2) recognition of such state law failure-to-
warn claims creates an unacceptable obstacle to achieving the purposes of 
Congress by unjustly substituting a lay jury’s decision for the expert 
judgment of the FDA.64  Conflicting preemption rulings across the country,65 
coupled with the FDA’s shifting position on the role of state tort law66 
persuaded the Court to grant Wyeth’s petition for certiorari.67 
2.  Creating a Clear Evidence Standard 
In a majority opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens,68 the Supreme 
Court rejected Wyeth’s impossibility preemption defense, noting that the 
FDA’s CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to supplement its IV push warnings 
without FDA approval.69  The Court held that, “absent clear evidence that 
the FDA would not have approved a change to Phenergan’s label,” Levine’s 
claims were not preempted.70  The Court assumed that there is a presumption 
against preemption and held that Wyeth failed to meet the “demanding” 
impossibility preemption defense.71  As part of its analysis, the Court noted 
that Wyeth failed to provide the FDA with an evaluation of the specific 
dangers of the IV push method or sufficient evidence that it attempted to add 
stronger warnings as required by state law but was prohibited from doing so 
by the FDA.72  The Court emphasized that notwithstanding FDA approval, a 
“manufacturer[] bears responsibility for the content of its label at all times.”73 
Justice Stevens also rejected Wyeth’s obstacle preemption defense 
because Levine’s state law claims did not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s 
 
 62. Id. at 563. 
 63. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 184 (Vt. 2006). 
 64. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563–64. 
 65. See Richard Ausness, The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on FDA Regulation of 
Prescription Drugs, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 253–54 (2010). 
 66. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug 
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 201, 314, and 601) (concluding that FDA approval of a drug’s label preempts state laws 
imposing liability for negligent labeling). 
 67. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 563. 
 68. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Anthony Kennedy, and 
Souter. Id. at 556. 
 69. Id. at 568–69. 
 70. Id. at 571 (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. at 573. 
 72. Id. at 572–73. 
 73. Id. at 570–71. 
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purposes in the FDCA.74  The Court held that the FDA’s 2006 preamble did 
not merit deference because it conflicted with the purpose of Congress75 and 
did not reflect the FDA’s long-standing position that federal law serves as 
the floor for state regulation.76  Justice Stevens also noted that the lack of a 
federal remedy or express preemption clause in the FDCA illustrated that 
Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring 
drug safety.77 
3.  Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
While the clear evidence standard set by the majority appeared 
straightforward on its face, the other opinions issued in Wyeth illustrated the 
Justices’ conflicting views about what constitutes impossibility preemption 
in the brand-name prescription drug context.  The Justices’ diverging 
understandings of statutory interpretation, separation of powers, and the role 
of federal agencies all led to vastly different conclusions about whether 
Levine’s claims were preempted. 
Although he joined the majority opinion, Justice Breyer wrote a separate 
concurrence acknowledging that federal regulations could preempt state tort 
law under certain circumstances, such as when state law interferes with the 
“FDA’s desire to create a drug label containing a specific set of cautions and 
instructions”78 or when the state law would force drug manufacturers to 
“raise prices to the point where those who are sick are unable to obtain the 
drugs they need.”79  Even so, Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the 
2006 preamble did not constitute such a regulation, and Levine’s state law 
claims could proceed.80 
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion 
expressing concern that the court had approved “far-reaching implied pre-
emption doctrines.”81  He argued that impossibility preemption analysis 
should turn on whether the text of state and federal laws contradict one 
another.82  He also noted that a conflict may exist even if it is physically 
possible to comply with both laws, such as when a federal law creates a right 
(not a duty) to engage in particular behavior forbidden by state law.83  In that 
case, an individual could comply with both federal and state law by refraining 
 
 74. Id. at 581. 
 75. Id. at 565 (“[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption 
case.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))); see also id. at 577. 
 76. Id. at 577. 
 77. Id. at 575. 
 78. Id. at 582 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. (citing Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug 
Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE 334, 335–36 (Peter Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 
1991)). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 82. Id. (noting that “implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the statutory text 
are inconsistent with the Constitution”). 
 83. Id. at 590. 
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from engaging in the behavior, even though the laws are contradictory.84  
Still, Justice Thomas concluded that the text of the FDCA did not preempt 
Levine’s claims because Wyeth could have strengthened Phenergan’s 
warnings under the CBE regulation, and the FDCA did not provide Wyeth 
with a right that state law rescinded.85  Justice Thomas also rejected the 
majority’s analysis of the purposes and objectives of Congress and argued 
that the majority’s broad interpretation permitted courts to find preemption 
even where Congress has not expressly preempted state law and where the 
text of federal and state laws are not in conflict.86 
Justice Alito dissented,87 arguing that it was “demonstrably untrue” that 
Phenergan “labeling did not contain a specific warning about the risks of IV-
push administration” when it was administered to Levine.88  Justice Alito 
reasoned that the FDA had properly considered the risks and benefits of the 
IV push method and had repeatedly concluded that Phenergan was safe and 
effective.89  He also noted that the majority’s holding that a jury, rather than 
the FDA, holds the power to regulate warning labels for brand-name 
prescription drugs was incompatible with the Court’s previous understanding 
of conflict preemption.90  Justice Alito claimed that the majority opinion 
“commit[ted] both factual and legal errors,”91 and that “faithful application 
of [the] Court’s conflict preemption cases compels the conclusion that the 
FDA’s 40-year-long effort to regulate the safety and efficacy of Phenergan 
preempts [Levine’s] tort suit.”92 
C.  The Aftermath of Wyeth 
Following Wyeth, courts were forced to make their own determinations 
about what constitutes clear evidence that the FDA would have prohibited 
brand-name drug manufacturers from adding stronger warnings required by 
state law.93  Not surprisingly, confusion surrounding this standard led to what 
some commentators regarded as “a hodgepodge of judicial opinions that have 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 593. 
 86. Id. at 594. 
 87. Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia. Id. at 
604 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 619. 
 89. Id. at 609. 
 90. Id. (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884–85 (2000)). 
 91. Id. at 612. 
 92. Id. at 610. 
 93. See, e.g., Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“The Supreme Court [in Wyeth] . . . did not clarify what constitutes ‘clear evidence.’”); 
Rheinfrank v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 749, 762 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (noting that the 
Wyeth court “did not define the ‘clear evidence’ standard, nor did it suggest the level of proof 
required”), aff’d, 680 F. App’x 369 (6th Cir. 2017); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F. Supp. 2d 
1264, 1270  (W.D. Okla. 2011) (“[A]pplication of the clear evidence standard is necessarily 
fact specific.”); Reckis v. Johnson & Johnson, 28 N.E.3d 445, 457 (Mass. 2015) (“Wyeth did 
not define ‘clear evidence.’”). 
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reached varying results.”94  For example, in 2010, on the same record and 
concerning the same label, the Seventh Circuit and the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court reached opposite conclusions about whether or not 
defendants showed clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a 
proposed label change to Children’s Motrin.95  Courts also split on whether 
Wyeth mandated a showing that the FDA had previously rejected the exact 
warning deficiency under consideration.96  Some jurisdictions held that the 
clear evidence standard is satisfied when the FDA had previously rejected an 
identical label change,97 while others held that such rejection was not critical 
to a successful preemption defense.98  Courts also disagreed on whether the 
FDA’s denial of a citizen petition or rejection of a different warning 
constituted clear evidence under Wyeth99 and whether impossibility 
preemption questions were questions of law for a judge or questions of fact 
for a jury.100 
One clear doctrine emerged after Wyeth:  in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,101 the 
Supreme Court held that in the context of generic drugs—as opposed to 
brand-name drugs, like Phenergan in Wyeth—state law failure-to-warn 
claims are always preempted by federal regulations.102  Regulation of generic 
drugs is covered not by the FDCA but by the Hatch-Waxman Act.103  Under 
the latter statute, passed in 1984, generic drug manufacturers can gain FDA 
approval by showing equivalence to an FDA-approved brand-name drug.104  
Changes under the CBE regulation are not available for generic drug labels 
 
 94. Michael M. Gallagher, Clear Evidence of Impossibility Preemption After Wyeth v. 
Levine, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 439, 479 (2015). 
 95. Compare Robinson v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 869–70, 873 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (concluding there was “clear evidence” the FDA would have rejected a proposed 
warning change for Children’s Motrin), with Reckis, 28 N.E.3d at 456–60 (reaching the 
opposite conclusion). 
 96. See Eric Lindenfeld, Brand Name Preemption:  The New Frontier in Pharmaceutical 
Product Liability Litigation, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 636, 636 (2017). 
 97. See, e.g., Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 
(D. Minn. 2011) (“[T]o trigger pre-emption, a brand-name manufacturer must show that the 
FDA would not have approved a proposed label change.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
In re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., 700 F.3d 1161 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 98. See Dobbs, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (holding that the defendant provided clear 
evidence that the FDA would have rejected a label change relating to increased suicide risk, 
despite the defendant having made no past attempts to add such warnings). 
 99. See Gallagher, supra note 94, at 465–68. 
 100. Compare S. Jersey Sanitation Co. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance 
Co., 840 F.3d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that “preemption determinations are questions 
of law”), with In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 120 (D. 
Mass. 2019) (holding that “preemption presents a question of fact”). 
 101. 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
 102. See id. at 609 (discussing failure-to-warn claims).  See generally Mut. Pharm. Co. v. 
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013) (extending PLIVA’s impossibility preemption analysis for 
generic manufacturers to design defect claims). 
 103. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 104. See id. § 102, 98 Stat. 1592–93 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)); 
PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 613 (noting that generic drug manufacturers have a federal duty to copy 
brand name labels exactly). 
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because generic labels must be identical to their brand-name counterparts.  
Therefore, it is impossible for a generic manufacturer to unilaterally add or 
strengthen warnings without violating the FDCA.105  While the Hatch-
Waxman Act streamlined the process of generic drug approvals and has led 
to lower-cost drugs for consumers, the Supreme Court has “effectively 
immunized” generic drug manufacturers from state law liability.106  Two 
years after PLIVA, the Court issued a similarly strong impossibility 
preemption ruling for a generic manufacturer in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. 
v. Bartlett.107 
Outside the context of generic drugs, however, it remains “exceedingly 
difficult to demonstrate that any consistent principle or explanatory variable 
emerges from the Supreme Court’s products liability preemption 
jurisprudence.”108  This is especially problematic given the dramatic rise in 
federal product liability lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers over 
the last several years.  Between June 2018 and June 2019, 38,848 product 
liability lawsuits were filed against pharmaceutical companies in federal 
courts, almost tripling the amount of cases filed just five years ago.109  
Moreover, out of the sixty-seven pending products liability multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) proceedings today, twenty-three of them (over 34 percent) 
involve pharmaceuticals.110  Persistent confusion among courts deciding 
these cases called for further Supreme Court intervention to clarify the 
preemption doctrine. 
II.  MERCK SHARP & DOHME CORP. V. ALBRECHT:  AN END TO THE 
PREEMPTION MUDDLE? 
In 2019, the Supreme Court revisited impossibility preemption in 
Albrecht.111  Albrecht presented the Court with an opportunity to break its 
decade-long silence on how courts should interpret Wyeth’s clear evidence 
standard.  Part II.A of this Note discusses the litigation leading up to the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  Part II.B examines Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion.  Parts II.C and II.D explore Justice Thomas and Justice Alito’s 
 
 105. See generally Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472; PLIVA, 564 U.S. 604. 
 106. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth 
Return to the Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 454 (2016). 
 107. 570 U.S. 472 (2013). 
 108. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:  An Institutional Approach, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 454 (2008). 
 109. See Table C-2—U.S. District Courts–Civil Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary 
(June 30, 2019), U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/statistical-tables-
federal-judiciary/2019/06/30 [https://perma.cc/7QKY-5HUP] (last visited June 22, 2020); see 
also Table C-2—U.S. District Courts–Civil Judicial Business (September 30, 2015), U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/judicial-business/2015/09/30 [https://perma.cc/ 
TRL9-QAGY] (last visited June 22, 2020) (stating that 13,939 product liability suits were 
commenced in 2014). 
 110. See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT—
DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY DISTRICT 1–4 (2019), https://www.jpml. 
uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDLs_by_District-November-19-2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XV47-PA6J]. 
 111. 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019). 
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concurring opinions, which, as in Wyeth, illustrate the Justices’ conflicting 
views on preemption and provide crucial insight for lower courts tasked with 
deciding preemption defenses.  Finally, Part II.E identifies three interpretive 
issues arising from the Albrecht majority that must be resolved to ensure a 
uniform doctrine. 
A.  The Fosamax Litigation 
Beginning in 2011, Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation (“Merck”) began 
to face what would ultimately become over a thousand lawsuits relating to 
Fosamax, its bisphosphonate osteoporosis drug for postmenopausal 
women.112  Plaintiffs in these cases alleged that Fosamax caused them to 
suffer atypical femoral fractures and that Merck’s FDA-approved Fosamax 
label failed to adequately warn of the risk of these fractures.113  More than 
260 of these cases are still pending in federal court today as part of an 
MDL.114  A complete understanding of the Albrecht decision requires a 
review of the drug’s label and the litigation leading up to the Supreme Court’s 
decision. 
1.  The Evolution of the Fosamax Label 
When the FDA approved Fosamax for the treatment of osteoporosis in 
postmenopausal women in 1995, it did not require Merck to include warnings 
about bone fractures.115  However, letters, meeting minutes, and internal 
memoranda reveal that Merck knew as early as 1990 that continuous use of 
Fosamax could make bones susceptible to serious deficiencies and certain 
types of fractures.116  Between 1990 and 2008, case studies and reports 
shared with Merck revealed a possible connection between bisphosphonate 
use and atypical femoral fractures.117  A particularly striking example 
occurred in 2005, when Merck received a report from Dr. Joseph Lane, a 
renowned expert in metabolic bone disorders such as osteoporosis.118  Dr. 
Lane’s report stated that 100 percent of his patients who were prescribed 
Fosamax experienced atypical femoral fractures.119  In fact, doctors at Lane’s 
 
 112. The Fosamax lawsuits include two MDLs and a multicounty litigation (MCL).  The 
second Fosamax MDL will be the focus of this Note.  There were 269 active cases in this 
MDL as of July 16, 2020. U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS 
REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY ACTIONS PENDING 1 (2020), https:// 
www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Actions_Pending-July-
16-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SD9-5CJP] [hereinafter JULY 2020 MDL STATISTICS REPORT]. 
 113. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1675. 
 114. See JULY 2020 MDL STATISTICS REPORT, supra note 112, at 1. 
 115. Brief for Respondents at 11, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290). 
 116. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II) at 100, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290). 
 117. Id. at 125–26. 
 118. Brief of Amici Curiae Joseph Lane, M.D., and Vincent Vigorita, M.D., in Support of 
Respondents at 2–3, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) [hereinafter Lane and Vigorita 
Brief]. 
 119. Id. at 18; see also id. at 3 (noting that no fewer than twenty-five patients taking 
Fosamax suffered from atypical femoral fractures). 
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hospital referred to these fractures as “Fosamax fractures.”120  Dr. Lane noted 
that his patients’ injuries were not typical stress fractures and emphasized 
that his patients taking Fosamax were experiencing fractures that orthopedic 
physicians had not previously seen.121 
Although Merck was aware of these studies and claimed to have kept the 
FDA informed of all relevant information,122 it is unclear if Merck revealed 
the true nature of the problem to the agency.123  Merck informed the FDA of 
studies concerning “stress fractures” but did not specify that the femoral 
fractures at issue were distinct from typical stress fractures.124  In June 2008, 
the FDA alerted Merck that it was “aware of reports regarding” atypical 
femoral fractures in patients using bisphosphonates, citing several of the key 
articles written on the issue.125  To address “concern[s] about this developing 
safety signal,” the FDA requested that Merck submit its own investigative 
reports on the connection between Fosamax and femoral fracture risks.126  
After submitting its materials, Merck requested a PAS label change in 
2008.127  The proposed label change added mentions of fractures to both the 
“Warnings and Precautions” and “Adverse Reactions” sections of the 
Fosamax label.128  Merck proposed referencing “‘low-energy femoral shaft 
fracture[s]’ in the Adverse Reactions section, and cross-referencing a longer 
discussion” of the fractures in the warnings and precautions section.129  
Under current federal regulations, warnings and precautions labels must 
describe “clinically significant adverse reactions,” including any that are 
“serious even if infrequent.”130  Adverse reactions labels must describe “the 
overall adverse reaction profile of the drug based on the entire safety 
database,” including a list of all “undesirable effect[s] reasonably associated 
with use of a drug.”131 
While the first sentence of Merck’s proposed warning and precautions 
label stated, “[l]ow-energy fractures of the subtrochanteric and proximal 
femoral shaft have been reported in a small number of bisphosphonate-
 
 120. Id. at 15. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) (noting that Merck 
brought the fracture considerations to the FDA’s attention throughout the 1990s and that in 
“2008, Merck provided the FDA with a periodic safety update that included over 30 pages of 
information regarding these fractures”). 
 123. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II), supra note 116, at 143 (“In my opinion, it appears 
that Merck was attempting to confound the true nature of the association between Fosamax 
and [atypical femoral fractures] by identifying numerous potential risk factors, very few of 
which were actually grounded in the available data.”). 
 124. See Lane and Vigorita Brief, supra note 118, at 1 (“Stress fractures are 
radiographically and symptomatically different from atypical femur fractures associated with 
long-term use of Fosamax.”). 
 125. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II), supra note 116, at 280–81. 
 126. Id. at 280. 
 127. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 11. 
 128. Id. at 11–12. 
 129. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1674 (2019). 
 130. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2019). 
 131. Id. § 201.57(c)(7). 
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treated patients,” the remainder of the proposed warning referred to the 
fractures as “stress fractures.”132  The proposed label also noted: “The 
number of reports of this condition is very low, and stress fractures with 
similar clinical features also have occurred in patients not treated with 
bisphosphonate.”133  According to Merck, it was “not possible . . . to 
establish whether treatment with [Fosamax] increase[d] the risk of [femoral 
fractures],” but Merck found it “important to include an appropriate 
statement about them in the product label” because of the temporal 
association between these fractures and bisphosphonate use.134 
In 2009, the FDA sent Merck a “‘Complete Response’ letter,” granting in 
part and denying in part Merck’s application.135  The FDA approved the 
addition of “‘low energy femoral shaft and subtrochanteric fractures’ to the 
Adverse Reactions section” because “‘there is some basis to believe’ 
Fosamax causes those fractures.”136  However, the FDA ultimately found 
that Merck’s justification for elevating the warning to the warnings and 
precautions section was “inadequate,” because “[d]iscussion of the risk 
factors for stress fractures is not warranted and is not adequately supported” 
by evidence.137  The FDA offered Merck an opportunity to “resubmit” its 
application and to “fully address” the Fosamax deficiencies.138  Instead, 
Merck withdrew its PAS application, added the approved femoral fracture 
language to the adverse reactions label through the CBE process, and did not 
resubmit its warnings and precautions label application or attempt to add 
further atypical femoral fracture language to the Fosamax label.139 
In March 2010, the FDA announced it was working with an outside task 
force to gather information on the risk of femoral fractures because data 
submitted by Merck and other manufacturers did “not show[] a clear 
connection between bisphosphonate use and a risk of atypical 
subtrochanteric femur fractures.”140  In October 2010, based on the task 
force’s report, the FDA required all bisphosphonate manufacturers to add the 
risk of atypical femoral fractures to the warnings and precautions sections of 
drugs’ labels, because “these atypical fractures may be related to long-
term . . . bisphosphonate use.”141  After this label change was mandated, 
hundreds of plaintiffs filed state law failure-to-warn suits claiming they were 
injured because of Merck’s concealment of the Fosamax fracture risk 
between 1995 and 2010.142 
 
 132. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 12. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Joint Appendix (Volume II of II) at 478, Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290). 
 135. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 15. 
 136. Id. at 15–16 (quoting 21 C.F.R § 201.57(c)(7)). 
 137. Id. at 16. 
 138. Joint Appendix (Volume II of II), supra note 134, at 512. 
 139. Brief for Respondents, supra note 115, at 16. 
 140. Joint Appendix (Volume II of II), supra note 134, at 519. 
 141. Joint Appendix (Volume I of II), supra note 116, at 246–47. 
 142. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 271 (3d. Cir. 
2017) (“Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs filed personal-injury suits against the drug 
manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme, alleging that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax caused 
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2.  Procedural History 
In 2011, the failure-to-warn actions against Merck involving atypical 
femoral fractures were consolidated as an MDL in the District of New Jersey 
and several cases were selected for trial.143  Just as Wyeth had argued ten 
years earlier, Merck claimed that plaintiffs’ state law failure-to-warn claims 
were preempted by FDA regulations.144  Merck argued that the FDA’s 
rejection of its PAS submission for an increased warning against “stress 
fractures” in the warning and precautions section of the Fosamax label 
demonstrated that the FDA would not have approved a label concerning 
atypical femoral fractures.145 
The first bellwether trial involved Bernadette Glynn, a patient who took 
Fosamax from 2002 to 2009 and suffered from an atypical femoral fracture 
that required surgical repair in 2009.146  Glynn claimed that her use of 
Fosamax caused this fracture.147  To ensure that any and all facts relevant to 
preemption would appear on the record, the judge deferred a ruling on the 
preemption issue until after the jury made its decision.148 
In June 2013, after considering the parties’ additional briefing, evidence, 
arguments, and the trial record, the district court dismissed Glynn’s claim 
based on federal preemption, holding that under Wyeth, clear evidence 
existed that “the FDA would not have approved a stronger warning to the 
Precautions section of the [Fosamax] label.”149  To show that no label change 
would have been accepted, the district court relied on:  the FDA’s rejection 
of the warnings Merck proposed for the warnings and precautions section of 
the Fosamax label, the FDA’s response letter to Merck cautioning that 
stronger warnings could make Fosamax “misbranded,” and the fact that the 
FDA never required Merck to submit new language or a different label 
change.150  After the dismissal, Merck moved for an order to show cause why 
the claims of all other plaintiffs with injuries prior to the date of Glynn’s 
injury should not also be dismissed pursuant to the court’s preemption 
ruling.151  The district court agreed and entered summary judgment for 
Merck.152 
 
them to suffer serious thigh bone fractures.”), vacated sub nom. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. 
v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019). 
 143. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 951 F. Supp. 2d 695, 697 
(D.N.J. 2013), vacated, 852 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 
1668. 
 144. Id. at 702. 
 145. Id. at 703. 
 146. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 11-5304, 08-08, 2013 
WL 1558697, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 2013). 
 147. Id. at *7. 
 148. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium):  Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2243, No. 11-
5304, 08-08, 2014 WL 1266994, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014), vacated, 852 F.3d 268 (3d. Cir. 
2017). 
 149. See In re Fosamax, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 700. 
 150. Id. at 703–04. 
 151. See In re Fosamax, 2014 WL 1266994, at *1. 
 152. See id. at *17. 
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Merck’s victory was short-lived.  Consumers of Fosamax appealed, and 
the Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that Wyeth required a 
heightened “clear and convincing” standard of proof153 and that plaintiffs had 
“produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the FDA 
would have approved a properly-worded warning about the risk of thigh 
fractures—or at the very least, to conclude that the odds of FDA rejection 
were less than highly probable.”154  The Third Circuit also rejected Merck’s 
claim that preemption questions should be decided by judges rather than 
juries.155 
Merck petitioned the Supreme Court, “ask[ing] the Court to decide 
whether Merck’s case and others like it ‘must . . .  go to a jury’ to determine 
whether the FDA, in effect, has disapproved a state-law-required labeling 
change.”156  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.157 
B.  Justice Breyer’s Opinion for the Court 
The Supreme Court ruled 9-0 that the availability of the impossibility 
preemption defense is a question of law to be decided by the judge, not the 
jury.158  In an opinion by Justice Breyer,159 the Supreme Court promptly 
rejected the Third Circuit’s analysis and remanded the case back to the Third 
Circuit.160 
The decisive question before the Court was whether impossibility 
preemption defenses should be decided by judges as a matter of law.161  The 
Court unanimously held that preemption is a question of law for judges to 
decide.162  The Court reasoned that judges are “better equipped” than juries 
“to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination” and “to 
interpret agency decisions in light of the governing statutory and regulatory 
context.”163  The Court also noted that deciding preemption questions as a 
matter of law would lead to “greater uniformity,” which is especially 
important when questions involve “the scope and effect of federal agency 
 
 153. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 285 (3d. Cir. 
2017), vacated sub nom. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019). 
 154. Id. at 271. 
 155. Id. at 290. 
 156. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1676; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Albrecht, 
139 S. Ct. 1668 (No. 17-290) (“This petition is the ideal vehicle in which to lay down a legal 
marker for when a failure-to-warn claim is properly preempted in the branded drug context, 
and thus revive the preemption defense that courts since [Wyeth] have narrowed virtually out 
of existence.”). 
 157. Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 138 S. Ct. 2705 (2018). 
 158. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1680–81. 
 159. Justices Ginsburg, Gorsuch, Sotomayor, and Thomas joined in the opinion. Id. at 
1671. 
 160. Id. at 1680–81. 
 161. Id. at 1679–80. 
 162. Id. at 1679. 
 163. Id. at 1680. 
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action.”164  Justice Breyer noted that even if factual determinations need to 
be made, the “‘better positioned’ decisionmaker is the judge.”165 
As part of its analysis, the Court accepted the opportunity to “elaborate 
Wyeth’s requirements along the way.”166  Although this analysis was not 
directly connected to the question before the Court, and could be considered 
dicta, uncertainty surrounding the correct application of Wyeth was a major 
reason for the Court granting certiorari.167  Therefore, Justice Breyer’s 
analysis of Wyeth is a crucial part of the Court’s opinion, and the framework 
Justice Breyer lays out must be followed by courts deciding future 
impossibility preemption defenses. 
The Court noted that in cases comparable to Wyeth, 
“clear evidence” is evidence that shows the court that the drug 
manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning 
required by state law, and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug 
manufacturer that the FDA would not approve a change to the drug’s label 
to include that warning.168 
The Court stated that these conclusions “flow from . . . precedents on 
impossibility preemption and the . . . regulatory scheme that we reviewed in 
Wyeth.”169  The Court also clarified that this definition of clear evidence is 
not a heightened evidentiary standard but simply a requirement that the court 
consider “whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably 
conflic[t].’”170 
The Court also elaborated on Wyeth’s discussion of CBE regulations, 
noting that these regulations “permit[] drug manufacturers to change a label 
to ‘reflect newly acquired information’ if the changes ‘add or strengthen a . . . 
warning’ for which there is ‘evidence of a causal association’” without prior 
FDA approval.171  While the FDA can ultimately reject CBE submissions if 
manufacturers cannot show a change is based on reasonable evidence, CBE 
regulations permit changes in the interim.  Thus, a manufacturer “will not 
ordinarily be able to show that there is an actual conflict between state and 
federal law such that it was impossible to comply with both.”172 
Lastly, the Court noted that because the Supremacy Clause only gives 
“supreme” status to “the Laws of the United States,”173 “pre-emption takes 
place ‘only when and if [the agency] is acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority.’”174  The Court provided several 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)). 
 166. Id. at 1676. 
 167. Id. (“In light of differences and uncertainties among the courts of appeals and state 
supreme courts in respect to the application of Wyeth, we granted certiorari.”). 
 168. Id. at 1672. 
 169. Id. at 1678. 
 170. Id. at 1679 (alteration in original) (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 
654, 659 (1982)). 
 171. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2019)). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
 174. Id. (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002)). 
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examples of actions that fall under this authority, including notice and 
comment rulemaking, formal rejection of a warning label that would have 
been adequate under state law, “or . . . other agency action carrying the force 
of law.”175 
Although Justice Breyer’s opinion suggested that Merck’s preemption 
defense failed because of the availability of CBE label changes, the Court did 
not answer the preemption question.  Instead, Justice Breyer remanded the 
case to the Third Circuit to fully consider the clarified standards outlined in 
the opinion and to treat the preemption question as one of law rather than 
fact.176  It is also possible that the Court remanded the case because it was 
not clear that enough Justices would reach the same conclusion about 
whether or not Merck’s preemption defense could succeed.  Although the 
judgment was unanimous, just as in Wyeth, the concurring opinions in 
Albrecht demonstrate enduring divides concerning how preemption 
principles apply in this context.177 
C.  Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
Although he concurred in the judgment, Justice Thomas explained in a 
separate opinion that Merck’s preemption defense should fail as a matter of 
law.178  Justice Thomas remained skeptical of impossibility preemption as 
the best test for determining whether a conflict exists between state and 
federal law.179  As in Wyeth, he relied on the “original meaning” of the 
Supremacy Clause to argue that preemption questions should be based on 
whether state and federal law are in “logical contradiction.”180  Nevertheless, 
Justice Thomas argued that Merck’s defense failed under either 
evaluation.181  Thomas found that state and federal law were not in logical 
contradiction because FDA approval does not shield a drug from being 
deemed unsafe by later federal action or the application of state law.182  
Justice Thomas also argued it was not impossible for Merck to comply with 
both state and federal law because “Merck point[ed] to no statute, regulation, 
or other agency action with the force of law that would have prohibited it 
from complying with its alleged state-law duties.”183  He went further than 
the majority and concluded that the FDA’s 2009 response letter and other 
agency communications suggesting the FDA would have denied a future 
label change were insufficient to preempt plaintiffs’ claims because 
“hypothetical agency action is not ‘Law,’” and “Merck’s belief that the FDA 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1680–81. 
 177. See infra Parts II.C, II.D. 
 178. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1681 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[E]ven under our impossibility 
precedents, Merck’s pre-emption defense fails.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1681–82. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1683–84. 
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would have eventually rejected a CBE application does not make an earlier 
CBE change impossible.”184 
D.  Justice Alito’s Concurrence 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, also 
concurred in the judgment, agreeing that impossibility preemption is a 
question of law.185  However, unlike Justice Thomas, Justice Alito argued 
that Merck’s preemption defense would likely succeed on remand.186  Justice 
Alito worried that the majority provided a “skewed summary” of the law that 
would mislead lower courts deciding preemption defenses.187  In particular, 
Justice Alito noted that a statutory provision enacted after the underlying 
events in Wyeth might impact the Third Circuit’s preemption analysis on 
remand.188  Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(A), the FDA has a duty to initiate 
a label change “[i]f the Secretary becomes aware of new information . . . that 
the Secretary determines should be included in the labeling of the drug.”189  
Because the FDA has the burden to take action under these circumstances, 
FDA inaction may be sufficient to establish that it disapproved of additional 
warnings.190  As Justice Alito noted, this mechanism does not “require the 
FDA to communicate to the relevant drug manufacturer that a label change 
is unwarranted; instead, the FDA could simply consider the new information 
and decide not to act.”191 
Justice Alito also noted that the majority made no mention of the 
possibility that the FDA would have accepted a PAS application instead of a 
CBE supplement where significant questions exist as to whether to modify 
existing labeling.192  Justice Alito agreed with Justice Breyer that Wyeth’s 
use of the phrase “‘clear evidence’ was merely a rhetorical flourish” and did 
not espouse a heightened evidentiary standard.193 
Lastly, Justice Alito’s concurrence illustrates factual disputes among the 
Justices.  Justice Alito criticized the majority’s “one-sided account,” noting 
that the FDA was aware of the atypical femoral fracture issue for years, 
regularly communicated with Merck about these risks, and studied all 
relevant information before instructing healthcare professionals and patients 
to continue using Fosamax.194  Justice Alito noted that the FDA itself has 
taken the position that its “decision not to require a label change prior to 
[conducting its own analysis] reflected the FDA’s ‘determin[ation]’ that a 
 
 184. Id. at 1683. 
 185. Id. at 1684 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 186. Id. at 1684–85. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1684. 
 190. See generally Douglas G. Smith, A Shift in the Preemption Landscape?, 87 TENN. L. 
REV. 213 (2019). 
 191. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1684 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 192. Id. at 1685. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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new warning” should not be added to the drug’s label.195  According to 
Justice Alito, state law failure-to-warn claims are preempted if the FDA 
“simply consider[ed] the new information and decid[ed] not to act”196 
because federal agencies are entitled to a “presumption” that they properly 
follow federal law.197 
E.  Interpretive Issues Raised by Justice Breyer’s Framework 
The three opinions in Albrecht highlight that, despite the Court’s 
unanimous judgment, members of the Court hold divergent views on the 
powers of the administrative state and the role of judicial scrutiny in federal 
preemption cases.198  While the majority chose not to answer the preemption 
question, Justice Thomas argued that Merck’s impossibility preemption 
defense should fail as a matter of law,199 and Justice Alito was convinced 
that Merck’s preemption defense should succeed.200  Lower courts tasked 
with applying the preemption framework outlined by Justice Breyer can use 
the concurring opinions to inform their analysis when determining whether 
defendant-manufacturers have satisfied Wyeth’s clear evidence requirement.  
When viewed collectively, the opinions in Albrecht and the preemption case 
law following Wyeth generate several questions about Justice Breyer’s 
framework. 
Three core interpretative issues arise from Justice Breyer’s opinion.  To 
succeed on an impossibility preemption defense, defendants must know:  (1) 
what it means for a brand-name drug manufacturer to “fully inform[]”201 the 
FDA, (2) what it means for federal and state law to “irreconcilably 
conflic[t],”202 and (3) what agency actions are included in the FDA’s 
“congressionally delegated authority.”203  Courts must agree on the answers 
to these questions in order to decide preemption defenses as a matter of law.  
This is no easy task.  The fact that the Supreme Court remanded the case, 
rather than simply reinstating the district court’s original holding, only 
highlights the difficulty of convergence on application.  The Third Circuit 
recently remanded the case back to the district court, tasking the district court 
judge with deciding whether state law claims are preempted in the remaining 
Fosamax lawsuits.204 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1684. 
 197. See id.; see also United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) (“[I]n 
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [federal agencies] have 
properly discharged their official duties.”). 
 198. See supra Parts II.A–II.C. 
 199. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1681–82 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 200. See id. at 1684–85 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 201. Id. at 1672 (majority opinion). 
 202. Id. at 1679. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Order, In re:  Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 14-1900 et al., 
MDL No. 2243, at 1 (3d Cir. Nov. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Remand Order] (“[T]hese cases shall 
be remanded to the District Court . . . to determine in the first instance whether the plaintiffs’ 
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III.  HOW SHOULD LOWER COURTS IMPLEMENT JUSTICE BREYER’S 
FRAMEWORK? 
Part III addresses the gaps left by Justice Breyer’s clear evidence 
framework.  Part III.A discusses what it means for a defendant-manufacturer 
to “fully inform[] the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by 
state law”205 by looking at impossibility preemption jurisprudence since 
Wyeth and exploring the relationship between impossibility preemption and 
fraud-on-the-agency claims.  Part III.B examines what it means for state and 
federal laws to irreconcilably conflict by analyzing how the adequacy of 
proposed label changes and the broad scope of the CBE regulation impact 
defendants’ abilities to comply with both state and federal law.  Finally, Part 
III.C explores the scope of the FDA’s congressionally delegated authority by 
looking at which agency actions have been held to carry the force of law. 
A.  The Meaning of the “Fully Informed” Requirement 
A major piece of Justice Breyer’s definition of clear evidence is evidence 
that shows the court that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of 
the reasons for the warning required by state law and that the FDA, in 
response to this information, informed the manufacturer that the FDA would 
not approve a change to the drug’s label to include such a warning.206 
1.  Applicability of the Fully Informed Requirement 
First, courts must decide when the duty to fully inform the FDA applies.  
The Supreme Court prefaced the clear evidence requirement with the 
language “in a case like Wyeth.”207  The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this 
language to mean that a drug manufacturer’s duty to fully inform the FDA 
only applies to cases involving Wyeth’s particular circumstances.208  Under 
this narrow view, defendants are only required to show clear evidence that 
the FDA was fully informed of justifications for warnings required by state 
law when a proposed label change is in dispute, as in Wyeth and Albrecht.209  
In Cerveny v. Aventis,210 the Tenth Circuit held that the FDA’s rejection of a 
citizen petition, rather than a proposed label change, did not require the 
defendant-manufacturer to show that it had fully informed the FDA under the 
clear evidence analysis and that, given this full information, the FDA would 
have rejected a unilateral label change, as in Wyeth.211 
 
state law claims are preempted by federal law under the standards described by the Supreme 
Court in its opinion.”) . 
 205. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1678. 
 206. Id. at 1672. 
 207. Id. at 1678. 
 208. See Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 783 F. App’x 804, 808 n.9 (10th Cir. 2019) (noting that 
because “Aventis argues a different ground [than Wyeth] to show that the FDA would have 
rejected the Cervenys’ proposed warning . . . Aventis is not left to show clear evidence that 
the FDA would have rejected any unilateral label change under the CBE regulation”). 
 209. See supra Parts I–II. 
 210. 783 F. App’x 804 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 211. See id. at 808 n.9. 
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Despite the Tenth Circuit’s view, plaintiffs will likely argue that courts 
should adopt a broader understanding of “a case like Wyeth” to include 
situations where the FDA was “fully informed” by someone other than the 
defendant, such as by a third-party in a citizen petition.212  That is exactly 
what the plaintiffs argued in Cerveny.213  However, the Tenth Circuit’s swift 
rejection of this “key difference” between Cerveny and Wyeth shows that 
courts may be predisposed to adopt a restricted understanding of what 
triggers the clear evidence requirement.214  While this reading of the clear 
evidence framework will restrain the viability of state law failure-to-warn 
claims, neither Albrecht nor Wyeth involved a citizen’s petition or other third-
party method of informing the FDA, so it is unlikely that the Supreme Court 
intended the doctrine to extend outside of the proposed warning context. 
2.  Ways to Satisfy the Fully Informed Requirement 
After establishing when defendants must fully inform the FDA, it must be 
decided how they can do so.  As the Third Circuit noted, some courts “have 
decided preemption cases by simply treating the facts of Wyeth as a yardstick:  
if the evidence for FDA rejection in a given case is less compelling than the 
manufacturer’s evidence in Wyeth . . . the manufacturer’s preemption 
defense fails.”215  Other courts have “exhaustively survey[ed] the post-Wyeth 
case law and . . . test[ed] the facts of a particular case against prior 
decisions.”216  Because neither approach “clarifies or builds out”217 the 
impossibility preemption doctrine, courts deciding impossibility preemption 
defenses must instead adopt a uniform understanding of what it means to 
“fully inform[] the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state 
law.”218  Without such uniformity, Justice Breyer’s framework cannot alert 
potential defendants of what to provide the FDA in order to avoid state law 
tort liability and cannot instruct lower court judges tasked with deciding 
preemption defenses as a matter of law.  Prior Supreme Court jurisprudence 
and the concurring opinions in Albrecht offer important clues to address this 
inquiry. 
 
 212. An FDA citizen petition is a vehicle for individuals and organizations to request that 
the FDA make changes to health policy, such as removing a drug from the market or altering 
a drug’s label. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(q); see also Michelle Yearly, Tenth Circuit Finally Shuts 
the Door Completely on Cerveny, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/08/tenth-circuit-finally-shuts-the-door-
completely-on-cerevny.html [https://perma.cc/6E99-XBB3]. 
 213. Cerveny, 783 F. App’x at 808 n.9 (“Specifically, [plaintiffs] contend that Albrecht 
‘dictates that only labeling changes sought by the manufacturer can lead to preemption,’ and 
that ‘[the defendant] never sought the changes proposed by the [plaintiffs].’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Letter from Adam S. Davis, Couns. for Plaintiffs/Appellants, to Elisabeth Shumaker, 
Clerk of U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Tenth Cir. 1 (May 28, 2019))). 
 214. Id. (“We see nothing in Wyeth or Albrecht excluding Aventis from justifying 
preemption on this basis.”). 
 215. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 284 (3d. Cir. 
2017), vacated sub nom. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1678. 
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a.  What Does Not Fully Inform the FDA? 
Deciphering what fully informs the FDA requires analyzing what the 
Supreme Court and lower courts applying Wyeth and its progeny have 
determined falls short of this requirement.  For example, in Wyeth, the Court 
held that Wyeth failed to fully inform the FDA because it failed to provide 
the agency with “an evaluation or analysis concerning the specific dangers 
posed by the IV-push method.”219  More recently, federal courts have found 
that the FDA’s failure to mandate a warning does not show that the 
manufacturer fully informed the FDA because a manufacturer always 
remains responsible for the contents of its label.220  Post-Albrecht, one state 
court has held that, in “misbranding avoidance” cases like Wyeth, defendants 
cannot claim they have fully informed the FDA unless they “have fully 
disclosed the need for the additional warning, only to be met with FDA 
refusal.”221 
The Albrecht concurrences provide further insight as to what does not 
satisfy this information requirement.  Justice Thomas noted that Merck’s 
preemption defense should fail as a matter of law because it offered “no 
statute, regulation, or other agency action with the force of law that would 
have prohibited it from complying with its alleged state-law duties.”222  
Justice Alito, however, argued that the FDA’s “extensive communication 
with Merck during the relevant period” demonstrated that the agency was 
fully informed of the risks of Fosamax and nonetheless determined that a 
label change was unnecessary until the FDA conducted its own analysis in 
2010.223 
On remand, the district court must resolve this factual dispute and decide 
whether Merck’s correspondence provided the FDA with all relevant 
information about the justifications for state law warnings regarding atypical 
femoral fractures. 
b.  Does Evidence the FDA Previously Accepted Suffice? 
Courts must also discern whether Albrecht enables plaintiffs to argue that 
evidence that the FDA previously accepted as adequate fails to fully inform 
the agency.  This is especially relevant to Justice Gorsuch’s “moral hazard” 
concern that brand-name drug manufacturers will attempt to “inform” the 
FDA by flooding the agency with so much information that it becomes 
 
 219. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009). 
 220. See Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that the FDA’s inaction in failing to mandate a warning about a drug’s risk of suicide does not 
show that defendant provided “clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a label change 
warning about the risk of suicide by young adults”). 
 221. A.Y. v. Janssen Pharm. Inc., 224 A.3d 1, 16–17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019) (holding that 
the defendant “did not make such a showing of full disclosure to the FDA during the relevant 
time”). 
 222. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1683–84 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 223. Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
2020] HEALING A FRACTURED PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 291 
impossible for agency officials to adequately understand a drug’s risks.224  
Information accompanying proposed label changes should not contain false 
information or be crafted in the hopes that a proposed label will be rejected, 
thereby shielding manufacturers from future state law failure-to-warn claims. 
In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,225 the Supreme Court held 
that a private plaintiff’s fraud claim predicated on a defendant’s fraudulent 
violation of FDA reporting requirements was impliedly preempted by the 
FDCA because such claims “inevitably conflict with the FDA’s 
responsibility to police fraud.”226  Armed with this holding, defendant-
manufacturers have successfully argued that strict limitations on fraud-on-
the-agency claims preclude plaintiffs from arguing that the FDA’s basis for 
rejecting or accepting a label change was insufficient.227  State law tort 
claims based on speculative arguments about what the FDA or a defendant-
manufacturer could have done differently have also been held preempted.228 
Applying Buckman broadly, some courts have held that any state law 
claims based on a defendant’s communications with the FDA are 
preempted.229  The district court in the Fosamax litigation adopted such a 
broad interpretation, holding that plaintiffs’ claims that Merck intentionally 
withheld information related to atypical femoral fractures could not 
proceed.230  Although the Buckman issue in the Fosamax litigation was not 
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 225. 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
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v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019). 
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questioned on appeal, the district court’s extension of Buckman was 
problematically aggressive; a narrower view of Buckman should be adopted 
by lower courts deciding impossibility preemption questions where agency 
fraud is a concern.  Construed narrowly, Buckman speaks only to 
circumstances in which a plaintiff raises a stand-alone, state-based claim of 
fraud-on-the-agency.231  Several courts, including the Second Circuit, have 
adopted this limited understanding.232  In Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & 
Co.,233 a case that raises similar issues to those in Albrecht,234 plaintiffs 
claimed they had evidence that Warner-Lambert, the defendant-
manufacturer, engaged in intentional withholding and misrepresentation of 
important safety information about Rezulin, a diabetes drug.235  Using 
Buckman as a shield, Warner-Lambert argued that plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-
FDA claims were preempted.236  While this deft argument succeeded at the 
district court level, Judge Guido Calabresi rejected the applicability of 
Buckman on appeal, holding that Buckman only applies to stand-alone fraud-
on-the-agency claims.237  Judge Calabresi noted that because the Rezulin 
case involved failure-to-warn claims traditionally regulated by the state, a 
presumption against preemption applies.238  No such presumption applied in 
Buckman.  Judge Calabresi also noted that the fraud-on-the-agency issue in 
Desiano served as an exception to a regulatory compliance defense under 
state law, whereas in Buckman, the fraud-on-the-agency issue was the cause 
of the entire action.239  Warner-Lambert petitioned the Supreme Court.240  
However, in reaching a 4-4 decision (with Chief Justice Roberts recusing 
himself), the Court merely affirmed with no precedential effect.241  A circuit 
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split on the issue remains,242 and no clear pattern has emerged among lower 
courts.243 
In his concurring opinion in Buckman, Justice Stevens advocated for a 
middle ground approach, arguing that fraud-on-the-agency claims should 
proceed “only when [they] are supported by an antecedent agency 
determination of fraud.”244  As torts scholar Professor Catherine Sharkey has 
argued, this approach best balances state and federal interests, allowing 
federal agencies and state tort law to work in tandem.245  This approach also 
ensures that fraud-on-the-agency claims will be preempted only if they would 
“encroach upon,” as opposed to “supplement and facilitate[] the federal 
enforcement scheme.”246 
The Albrecht majority and concurring opinions do not mention Buckman 
or fraud-on-the-agency concerns, which several commentators have flagged 
as a careless oversight.247  These commentators claim that “any 
determination in a state-law-based case of whether the FDA was ‘fully 
informed’ about anything runs headlong into Buckman.”248  However, this is 
not the case.  The Supreme Court omitted mention of Buckman because the 
agency fraud was no longer an issue in the case.  The Court might also have 
avoided weighing in on Buckman because the Court was concerned that, as 
in Warner-Lambert, the politics of preemption would deadlock the Court, 
providing future litigants with no clear path forward. 
Although the Court did not revisit the fraud issue, Albrecht cannot stand 
for the proposition that anything defendants submit to the FDA, even if 
fraudulent, can “fully inform” the agency under the clear evidence 
framework.  Manufacturers cannot evade state law tort liability by inundating 
the FDA with information, armed with Buckman as a protection from any 
liability.  This is exactly the “moral hazard” concern that Justice Gorsuch 
articulated during oral arguments.249  To protect against such abuse, lower 
courts should adopt Judge Calabresi’s narrow view of Buckman:  a 
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presumption against preemption should apply to fraud-on-the-FDA claims 
that arise as exceptions to defenses to state law failure-to-warn claims.  
Alternatively, courts can adopt Justice Stevens’s more moderate approach 
and hold that fraud-on-the-FDA claims in cases like Albrecht can only 
proceed if the FDA has previously established the existence of fraud. 
3.  Is Actual FDA Response Required? 
Establishing how defendants can fully inform the FDA is only the first 
piece of the inquiry.  Once a defendant shows it fully informed the FDA, 
Justice Breyer’s framework requires that defendants show that “the FDA, in 
turn, informed the drug manufacturer that [it] would not approve changing 
the drug’s label to include that warning.”250  This second prong raises 
questions about whether the FDA must actually notify defendants of a 
decision not to require a label or if FDA inaction can “inform” defendants of 
the FDA’s determination that further warnings are unnecessary. 
As Justice Alito noted in his concurring opinion, in certain scenarios, FDA 
inaction may signal the agency’s determination that a label change is not 
required.251  Under 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(A), if the secretary of health and 
human services discovers new information about a drug and determines that 
a label change is required based on this data, the FDA has a duty to 
unilaterally initiate a label change.252  “The FDA’s duty does not depend on 
whether the relevant drug manufacturer, as opposed to some other entity or 
individual, brought the new information to the FDA’s attention.”253  
However, if the secretary decides not to act on this new information about a 
drug, the FDA is not required to communicate to the relevant drug 
manufacturer that a label change is unwarranted; the agency can simply 
decide not to act.254 
In a case like Albrecht, where a defendant-manufacturer has submitted a 
proposed label change and the secretary’s unilateral actions under 
§ 355(o)(4)(A) are not at issue, an actual FDA response is likely required to 
fully inform defendants that a proposed label was rejected.  A state court in 
Connecticut recently addressed a defendant’s argument that was based on 
Justice Alito’s concurrence.255  The defendant contended that “submission of 
data to the FDA, even after the injury in question, followed by FDA inaction 
demonstrates that the FDA would have rejected a proposed labeling change 
even if the [manufacturer] had submitted the information in time for a label 
change prior to the injury.”256  The court noted “[t]here is admittedly some 
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logic to this argument.”257  However, it ultimately rejected the argument and 
held that Albrecht required a showing of clear evidence “that the FDA 
actually informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve 
changing the drug’s label to include that warning.”258  This case illustrates 
that lower courts are already using the Albrecht concurrences to inform their 
answers to impossibility preemption questions. 
4. Summary 
In sum, the fully informed requirement should be restricted to cases 
involving rejections of proposed label changes, rather than other third-party 
methods of informing the FDA.  At a minimum, a defendant can satisfy this 
requirement if, after providing the FDA with an up-to-date analysis of the 
risk at issue, the FDA refused to accept the additional warning.  While an 
actual FDA response might not be necessary in every case, when a 
defendant’s proposed label change is at issue, an FDA response is likely 
necessary to ensure that a defendant is adequately informed of the FDA’s 
decision.  Courts should adopt a narrow or moderate view of Buckman.  
Further, defendants facing failure-to-warn claims cannot use Buckman as a 
broad shield from tort liability. 
B.  When Do State and Federal Laws Irreconcilably Conflict? 
In addition to analyzing what fully informs the FDA, lower court judges 
deciding impossibility preemption questions must interpret what it means for 
state and federal laws to irreconcilably conflict.259  Although the Supreme 
Court notes this is a “simpl[e] ask,” in reality, it seems quite complex.260 
In the context of proposed label changes, as in Wyeth and Albrecht, an 
analysis of irreconcilable conflict must begin by determining whether a 
defendant’s proposed label provides an adequate description of a drug’s 
risks.  If the FDA rejects a brand-name drug manufacturer’s label change 
because the agency determines the label is inadequate, a defendant-
manufacturer cannot argue that this rejection makes it impossible to comply 
with both state and federal law.  A proposed warning is adequate if it provides 
clear, comprehensive, and accurate information about a drug’s risks and side 
effects.261  As Professors John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky 
noted in their amicus brief to the Court, the “FDA’s rejection of [Merck’s] 
understated and muddled warning in no way indicates that the agency would 
have rejected a warning of the risk of atypical femoral fractures that was 
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adequate in the relevant dimensions.”262  In fact, the FDA invited Merck to 
resubmit an adequate proposed warnings and precautions label but Merck 
failed to do so.263  Because there is a strong argument that Merck never 
presented the FDA with an adequate label concerning atypical femoral 
fractures, Merck cannot argue that the FDA’s rejection of its 2008 proposed 
warnings and precautions label creates an irreconcilable conflict between 
state and federal law.264  A key purpose of state failure-to-warn law is 
protection against inadequate labeling of drugs’ dangerous side effects and 
risks.265  Defendant-manufacturers cannot use impossibility preemption as a 
mechanism to avoid their state law duties.266  The issue of inadequate 
labeling traces back to Wyeth.267  In fact, the proposed warning rejected by 
the FDA in Wyeth was considerably stronger than the rejected “stress 
fractures” label at issue in Albrecht, highlighting the weakness of Merck’s 
conflict argument.268  “Evidence of a rejection of an adequate warning is the 
‘clear evidence’ that was missing in [Wyeth], and is likewise missing in 
[Albrecht].”269  Thus, the question becomes whether any warning that would 
have been adequate under state law would have been impermissible 
according to the FDA.  If there are some clear and nuanced warnings that 
would have been permissible to the FDA and also would have been adequate 
under state law, there is no irreconcilable conflict. 
Justice Breyer’s framework in Albrecht also raises questions about 
whether the CBE label change process will preclude brand-name drug 
manufacturers from showing that state and federal law irreconcilably 
conflict.270  Under CBE regulations, drug manufacturers can unilaterally 
change a drug’s label if changing the label would add or strengthen a warning 
based on new information that shows a causal link between a drug and a risk 
or harm.271  In Wyeth, the Court reasoned that because Wyeth made no 
attempt to make a label change through the CBE process, it failed to show it 
was impossible to change its product label under state law and still comply 
with federal law.272  In Albrecht, “Merck conceded that the FDA’s CBE 
regulation would have permitted [it] to try to change the label to add a 
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warning before [the FDA required it to do so in] 2010” but argued that the 
FDA would have rejected such a warning.273 
While Wyeth and Albrecht demonstrate that the availability of the CBE 
label change process will severely weaken many impossibility preemption 
arguments, the CBE regulation does not destroy the impossibility preemption 
defense because the regulation cannot be applied in every case.  As 
previously stated, label changes made in accordance with the CBE regulation 
can only be based on “newly acquired information,” and the FDA has stated 
it will “not allow a change to labeling to add a warning in the absence of 
reasonable evidence of an association between the product and an adverse 
event.”274  Courts must also note that “the FDA contemplated that the CBE 
regulation would be used sparingly.”275  For example, one federal court 
applying Albrecht recently held that a single study performed on mice 
showing a drug’s adverse effects fails to establish such reasonable evidence 
and cannot support a state law failure-to-warn claim arguing that a defendant-
manufacturer should have attempted to add a CBE label change.276  If 
plaintiffs cannot plausibly show that a defendant-manufacturer could have 
unilaterally changed its label, it will be much easier for defendants to show 
that failure-to-warn claims are preempted.277 
Because CBE label changes are only available if certain new information 
becomes available, courts should not read Wyeth or Albrecht to require 
defendant-manufacturers to attempt unilateral label changes to show that 
compliance with state and federal law is impossible.  Such a requirement runs 
headlong into Justice Gorsuch’s concern that manufacturers will flood the 
FDA with inartful, confusing warnings in the hopes that the FDA will reject 
them.278  Defendants cannot plan their own label rejections to show an 
irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law. 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence should also inform courts’ understanding of 
what demonstrates an irreconcilable conflict.279  In both Wyeth and Albrecht, 
Justice Thomas argued that evidence from the founding era shows that state 
and federal law directly conflict when they are in logical contradiction, even 
if compliance with both laws is possible.280  In Albrecht, Justice Thomas 
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noted that “if federal law gives an individual the right to engage in certain 
behavior that state law prohibits, the laws would give contradictory 
commands notwithstanding the fact that an individual could comply with 
both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior.”281  In a recent 
concurrence to a denial of certiorari, Justice Gorsuch also noted that “[a]t the 
time of the founding, [the Supremacy] Clause would have been understood 
to pre-empt state law only if the law logically contradicted the ‘Constitution,’ 
[or] the ‘Laws of the United States.’”282  This opinion shows that the 
idiosyncratic “logical contradiction” method may be gaining support among 
the bench as future preemption cases reach the Supreme Court. 
In sum, the FDA’s rejection of an inadequate label change does not create 
an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal law.  Additionally, while 
the availability of the CBE regulation weakens the impossibility preemption 
defense, the limited applicability of CBE label changes restricts courts’ 
ability to require these label changes to demonstrate an irreconcilable 
conflict.  In addition to an impossibility preemption analysis, courts should 
conduct a “logical contradiction” analysis because this method is supported 
by at least two Justices. 
C.  What Actions Are Within the Scope of the FDA’s Congressionally 
Delegated Authority? 
The final question raised by Justice Breyer’s Albrecht framework relates 
to the Court’s statement that only agency actions “taken pursuant to the 
FDA’s congressionally delegated authority” can determine the answer to 
preemption questions.283  The answer to this question is especially relevant 
to the future of the Fosamax litigation.  In its order remanding the case back 
to the district court, the Third Circuit specifically instructed the court to 
“determine the effect of the FDA’s Complete Response Letter and other 
communications with Merck on the issue of whether such agency actions are 
sufficient to give rise to preemption.”284 
While Justice Breyer cautioned that “[t]he question of disapproval 
‘method’ [was] not . . . before [the Court],” he noted that, “[f]ederal law 
permits the FDA to communicate its disapproval of a warning by means of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking setting forth labeling standards; by formally 
rejecting a warning label that would have been adequate under state law; or 
with other agency action carrying the force of law.”285  To properly decide 
impossibility preemption questions, lower courts must adopt a common 
understanding of these other agency actions. 
First, courts should establish what agency actions do not carry the force of 
law.  In Wyeth, the Court held that the FDA’s 2006 preamble declaring that 
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state law failure-to-warn claims threaten the role of the FDA did not carry 
the force of law because “Congress has not authorized the FDA to pre-empt 
state law directly.”286 
The Albrecht concurring opinions provide little consensus on this point.  
Justice Thomas advocated for an even narrower position, noting that only 
final agency actions carry the force of law.287  Unlike the majority opinion, 
Justice Thomas did not consider the FDA’s 2009 response letter to Merck’s 
stress fracture warning to carry the force of law because response letters have 
“no implication as to the ultimate approvability of [an] application.”288  
Justice Thomas also noted that “neither agency musings nor hypothetical 
future rejections constitute pre-emptive ‘Laws.’”289  Conversely, Justice 
Alito argued that in several scenarios, FDA inaction may carry the force of 
law, such as when the secretary of health and human services chooses not to 
act on newly acquired information under § 355(o)(4)(A).290  Justice Alito 
also noted the relevance of the FDA’s informal communications with Merck 
leading up to the required label change in 2010.291  Recognizing all FDA 
contacts with defendant-manufacturers as relevant to the preemption analysis 
gives the FDA much latitude to preempt state law claims.  One federal court 
recently noted that public informal communications between the FDA and 
drug manufacturers should receive such judicial notice.292  While confusion 
and controversy remain regarding what specific agency actions have 
preemptive effect, one trend is clear:  Albrecht continues the Supreme 
Court’s trend of shifting institutional power away from the courts and into 
the hands of federal agencies.293 
CONCLUSION 
As products liability suits against pharmaceutical companies continue to 
rise, federal preemption in the prescription drug context is likely to remain a 
hotly litigated issue.  The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in the federal 
preemption doctrine marks an important step forward in clarifying the 
procedure for deciding impossibility preemption defenses.  It is now clear 
that judges, rather than juries, must decide impossibility preemption 
questions as a matter of law.  However, divides among the Justices as to how 
these questions should be answered remain.  While Justice Breyer’s 
framework in the Court’s recent Albrecht decision contains several 
interpretive gaps, it is nonetheless illuminating for lower courts trying to 
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frame impossibility preemption questions.  The concurring opinions in 
Albrecht and the case law since 2009 help to fill the gaps left by the majority 
opinion and are instructive for courts ruling on these defenses. 
